









After drinking with his buddies one evening, Tom was tired. While they vowed to carry on all night–and did--he went home and slept. Tom intentionally omitted to join them in toasting the sunrise. Was he engaged in some kind of behavior at dawn? Something dormitive, perhaps, but nothing of the kind that action theory aims to characterize.
	We can perfectly well use ‘behavior’ in a broader sense, to cover all things done intentionally, including Tom’s omitting to drink till dawn. But if we do, we should see that “behavior” is a disparate category, including actions and things that aren’t actions. And we should then not expect a highly uniform theory of this broader phenomenon.
	If, then, the right account of intentional omission doesn’t precisely parallel a causal theory of action, does this fact make trouble for “causalism as an attempt to explain what it is for an agent to behave intentionally” (as Sartorio, “Omissions and Causalism,” p. 513, claims)? That depends on just how the correct account goes and to what exactly “causalism” is committed.
	Sartorio alleges that a proponent of causalism will hold that when one intentionally omits to A, one’s omission is caused by one’s forming an intention not to A (or an intention with some other relevant content). But a causal theory of action doesn’t commit one to this view, since it isn’t a theory of things that aren’t actions; and one can be a causalist about intentional behavior, broadly construed, without holding this view. Indeed, Sartorio’s account of intentional omission is causalist while rejecting the indicated view, for she holds that a paradigmatic intentional omission is caused by one’s omission to intend.
	Still, as her account is spelled out, something that a standard causal theory requires for intentional action–an important causal role for mental states or events–is not said to be required for intentional omission. If there is no such requirement, that is an important fact, even if it doesn’t force the rejection altogether of a causal approach to intentional behavior.
	However, I’m not convinced that no such requirement falls on intentional omission. Consider, first, what Sartorio says suffices for intentionally omitting to A: that the omission is caused by one’s intentionally omitting to intend to A (or to have some other pertinent intention). It strikes me as a misstep to try to account for one omission’s being intentional by appealing to yet another omission’s being intentional. Further, the notion of intentionally omitting to intend is rather obscure, and I don’t see that Sartorio provides much clarification of it.
	One does not intentionally omit to intend to A, she holds, if A-ing does not even cross one’s mind; that much seems right. One intentionally omitted to intend to A, she says, if one “voluntarily failed to form that intention, after deliberating about whether to do so, after considering reasons for and against doing so, etc.” (“Omissions and Causalism,” p. 523). As I observed in my paper, the claim that the omission to intend was voluntary seems to presuppose that, rather than explain how, it was intentional. And the fact that one had deliberated and considered relevant reasons and still not formed the intention doesn’t suffice to make the omission to intend intentional, for one might have simply failed to make up one’s mind. 
	It’s not just that Sartorio hasn’t specified “precisely the conditions under which an omission to intend to A is intentional” (“Comments,” p. 2). There are few philosophically interesting phenomena for which we can do this. Rather, the notion appealed to here is left quite unclear, and the appeal seems both unnecessary and unhelpful. We are not told, for example, whether intentionally omitting to intend to A requires that the omission to intend to A be caused by something in particular (some further omission, or the individual’s mental states), or whether in order for that omission to be intentional, there must be some further intentional omission to intend. The latter requirement, of course, would threaten an endless regress; but if the regress can be stopped at this point, why can’t it be avoided altogether?
	Although Sartorio doesn’t claim that intentionally omitting to intend to A (or to have some other pertinent intention) is necessary for intentionally omitting to A, it is perhaps worth observing that it doesn’t seem to be. One might intentionally omit to A without having deliberated about whether to A, and without having made a decision on the matter. One might spontaneously--and nonactively–acquire an intention not to A without having raised the question of whether to A, just as one can so acquire an intention to act. (Audi, 1993, p. 64, provides a nice example of the latter. As for the former: I see a snake crossing the path ahead, and I immediately intend not to take another step forward. I refrain from walking further.) If one’s omitting to intend to A (e.g., to continue walking) might nevertheless be intentional, it remains to be explained how this can be so.
	Indeed, strictly speaking, lacking an intention to A isn’t necessary for intentionally omitting to A. One can have intentions of which one is unaware, just as one can have beliefs and desires of which one is unaware. Unaware that one intends not to A, one might A, and do so intentionally–meaning then to A (and A-ing attentively, carefully, expertly). Similarly, unaware that one intends to A, one might refrain from A-ing, meaning then not to A.
	Just how far Sartorio’s view of intentional omission diverges from what causal theorists require for intentional action depends on what she thinks about omitting for reasons, something that she doesn’t discuss. Things done intentionally are typically done for reasons. If one’s omitting to intend on some occasion is intentional, and done for reasons, we might ask in virtue of what the latter is so. Must certain of one’s reason-states–one’s beliefs, desires, affections, aversions, etc.–be causes of one’s omitting to intend? If Sartorio accepts such a requirement, that will render her account more thoroughly causalist, even if it still denies intentions any necessary causal role. If she denies the requirement, then we might fairly request a sketch of some alternative view.
	I claimed in my paper that in order to intentionally omit to A, one’s intention not to A (or some other pertinent intention) must cause some of one’s subsequent thought and action. It must play a causal role with respect to what does happen, even if it need not cause any absences. Sartorio asks what my argument for this claim is. I observed that in standard cases of intentional omission, such an intention does in fact cause such things. And when I considered a case in which this was not so, it seemed to me that the omission was then not intentional, and that it failed to be intentional because the intention in question didn’t play the indicated causal role.
	In the imagined case (pp. 18-19), Diana decided not to jump into a pond to save a drowning child. She then wondered what to do instead, formed an intention to walk over to get a better view of the impending tragedy, and did so. But her intention not to jump in caused none of these things; they were all caused by a chip that had been implanted in Diana’s brain earlier by a team of neuroscientists, who (unaware of Diana’s decision) just happened to have picked this moment to test their device. They got lucky, for the chip, I noted, had an unforeseen flaw: it would have remained inert if, when the activation signal was sent, the agent in whose brain it was implanted had just decided to jump into water.
	Sartorio finds no support here for the causal requirement I proposed. There are, she says, other possible explanations of why Diana’s not jumping in isn’t intentional. She suggests, first, that Diana’s omission might fail to be intentional because her omitting to intend to jump in doesn’t cause her not jumping in. But is that so? The chip causes Diana’s thought and action, but, as Sartorio recognizes, it’s a further question what causes Diana’s omitting to jump in. As the case is imagined, if Diana had intended to jump in, she would have; her not so intending made a difference to what she did. If omissions to intend ever cause omissions to act, it isn’t clear why this one doesn’t.
	Second, Sartorio suggests that Diana’s omitting to jump in might fail to be intentional because her intending not to jump in doesn’t cause that omission. But if that is correct, it suggests that intentions not to act must play an even more robust causal role in intentional omissions than what I argued, and the right account of intentional omission will, after all, closely parallel a causal theory of intentional action.
	Finally, Sartorio suggests that in order for Diana to have intentionally omitted to jump in, she must have intended to perform some act incompatible with her jumping in, and that intention must have caused that action. But, as I think the paint case from my paper (p. 5) shows, intentionally omitting to A doesn’t require performing any action that one takes to be incompatible with A-ing; it doesn’t require, either, intending to perform any such action. 
	There might, in fact, be more than one correct explanation of why Diana’s omitting to jump in isn’t intentional, as there will be if several necessary conditions are unsatisfied. Though the case seems to me supportive, perhaps no single example will decisively show my proposal correct. The proposal can, however, be undermined if there is a case in which someone intentionally omits something and yet no relevant intention plays the indicated causal role.
	I said that in standard cases of intentional omission, one’s intention not to act (or other relevant intention) is in fact a cause of one’s subsequent thought and action. Sartorio disputes this claim. In my case involving Ann (p. 1), she maintains, it is Ann’s intention to play piano, not her intention not to pick up Bob, that causes her piano playing. But the two intentions aren’t competitors; they are, respectively, later and earlier members of a causal sequence leading to Ann’s playing piano. The intention not to pick up Bob causes Ann to consider what to do instead, which causes her to decide to play piano, which causes her piano playing. One need not hold that causation is necessarily transitive to find plausible the claim that Ann’s intention not to pick up Bob indirectly causes her piano playing.
	Comparing Ann’s intention not to pick up Bob with her omitting to pick him up, Sartorio asks, “Why think that bodily positive and negative acts have different causal powers but their mental counterparts (positive and negative intentions) don’t?” (“Comments,” p. 4). But Ann’s intention not to pick up Bob is an intention, whereas her omitting to pick him up is not an action. Were the case real, the former would be an actually existing being, negative only in its content (just as is my belief that Santa Claus doesn’t exist). In contrast, the latter (I’m inclined to think) would be an absence of being–the absence of an act by Ann of picking up Bob at the airport. A causal impotence of the latter is no reflection on the former.
	Although I don’t, in my paper, dispute Sartorio’s claim that omissions to intend cause intentional omissions, I’m in fact doubtful about this. At bottom, I find it doubtful that an absence of being can cause something. Sartorio writes of omissions having causal powers; but I don’t see how nonbeings can have any such powers. 
	I’ve advanced considerations favoring an account of intentional omission that makes no appeal to causation by absences. The proffered view accords a causal role to mental states, including intentions, and sees intentional omissions as resulting–even if noncausally–from such states. If an account along these lines is correct, omissions make trouble neither for causal theories of action nor for causal approaches to intentional behavior, broadly construed.









